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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ZONING-THE GRANTING OF A VARIANCE 
BASED ON UNNECESSARY HARDSHIP-Defendant purchased a tract of vacant 
land located in the most highly restricted residence zone of his city. The 
local zoning ordinance prescribed minimum area, width, and depth 
measurements for building plots in that district. Defendant desired to 
subdivide the property into two building plots in order to build a one-
family residence on each plot. Although the first plot complied with the 
minimum requirements of the ordinance, the other plot was deficient in 
area and depth measurements. Defendant was unsuccessful in his attempts 
both to purchase adjoining land and to sell parts of his property to 
adjoining owners. He then applied to the local Board of Adjustment for a 
variance from the zoning ordinance, claiming hardship because of the 
shape of his property. The board granted the variance holding that the 
strict application of the zoning ordinance under the circumstances "would 
work an undue hardship on the owner." Plaintiffs, property owners in the 
immediate neighborhood, contested the validity of the variance. The 
lower court affirmed the grant of the variance. On appeal, held, reversed. 
The defendant failed to establish a case of undue hardship as required 
by the zoning ordinance. Bierce v. Gross, (N.J. 1957) 135 A. (2d) 561. 
Since a zoning ordinance cannot possibly meet all the contingencies of 
an existing situation, most state enabling acts provide that each community 
may establish a local board of adjustm.ent1 with authority to vary the 
application of the zoning ordinance in appropriate cases. In substance a 
1 The board which grants variances is called a board of appeals or a board of 
Teview. The first such board appeared in New York City's pioneer zoning ordinance in 
1916 and was called the board of appeals. See BASSElT, ZoNING, 2d ed., lllll-141 (1940). 
1958] RECENT DECISIONS 821 
typical ordinance provides that a board of adjustment shall have power 
to vary the application of the provisions of the zoning ordinance provided 
that (1) there are "practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships"2 caused 
by a strict application of the ordinance; (2) such variance is in harmony 
with the general purpose and intent of the ordinance; and (3) the public 
safety and welfare is assured and substantial justice done.3 Since the 
provision requiring "practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships" 
constitutes the heart of the variance remedy, most cases relating to variances 
are primarily involved with that requirement.4 Although the courts have 
not defined the meaning of those terms with certainty, five principles or 
standards have emerged from the cases which, to a certain extent, limit 
the discretion of a board. First, the ordinance must cause the hardship; 
independent factors, such as deed restrictions5 or the inherent nature of 
the property,6 are not subjects for which the variance remedy is intended. 
Second, the cases indicate that the property owner must, in effect, show 
that he is precluded from making any reasonable use of his property.7 
This factor-that the property is not suitable for use as zoned-appears 
to be the most important as well as the most practical consideration in 
determining the existence of unnecessary hardship.8 Contained in this 
second standard is the almost universal statement by the courts that 
financial disappointment alone,9 including loss of profits10 or prohibition of 
2 Some ordinances require "peculiar" or "exceptional" difficulties and "undue," 
"unusual," or "unreasonable" hardships. 
3 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §25.166 (1957). 
4 The standard of unnecessary hardship has been subject to criticism as being too 
jmprecise to define: "The words 'practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship' . • . were 
not well chosen ••• and their continued use has been very unfortunate. They almost 
defy critical analysis." Maltbie, "The Legal Background of Zoning," 22 CONN. B. J. 2 at 
-6, 7 (1948). 
5 Brackett v. Board of Appeal, 311 Mass. 52, 39 N.E. (2d) 956 (1942). 
6 Hickox v. Griffin, 298 N.Y. 365, 83 N.E. (2d) 836 (1949). 
7 E.g., Board of Adjustment v. Stovall, (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) 218 S.W. (2d) 286. See 
Green, "The Power of the Zoning Board of Adjustment To Grant Variances from the 
Zoning Ordinance," 29 N.C. L. R.Ev. 245 (1951). 
s Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E. (2d) 851 (1939) (applicant failed to show 
that the property could not be used for the uses permitted in the district); Matter of 
Clark v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 301 N.Y. 86, 92 N.E. (2d) 903 (1950) (denial of applica• 
tion for a funeral home); Talmage v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 141 Conn. 639, 109 A. 
(2d) 253 (1954); Elkins Park Improvement Assn. Zoning Case, 361 Pa. 322, 64 A. (2d) 
783 (1949). 
9 McMahon v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 433, 101 A. (2d) 284 (1953); 
Rochester Transit Corp. v. Crowley, 205 Misc. 933, 131 N.Y.S. (2d) 493 (1954). The very 
purpose of the ordinance would be undermined if financial loss alone justified granting 
a variance since all zoning effects some financial hardship in individual cases by depriv-
ing the landowner of the most advantageous use of his property. See, e.g., Holy Sepulchre 
Cemetery v. Board of Appeals, 271 App. Div. 33, 60 N.Y.S. (2d) 750 (1946); Dooling's 
Windy Hill v. Springfield Township Zoning Board of Adjustment, 371 Pa. 290, 89 A. 
(2d) 505 (1952). 
10 Benson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 129 Conn. 280, 27 A. (2d) 389 (1942); Devaney 
v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 132 Conn. 537, 45 A. (2d) 828 (1946). 
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the most profitable use of the property,11 will not justify a variance. How-
ever, since the difference benveen the denial of the right to any reasonable 
return and the mere deprivation of profits is a question of degree, financial 
hardship is not entirely irrelevant.12 A third standard which is significant 
in determining whether unnecessary hardship exists requires that the 
hardship caused by the ordinance must be peculiar to the particular 
property of the applicant,13 as distinguished from a hardship common to 
the whole neighborhood.14 If the plight of the owner is due to the general 
conditions in the neighborhood, this may indicate that the basic zoning 
ordinance is in need of a revision which can be accomplished only by the 
local legislative authority.15 A fourth standard states that the applicant 
must show that the hardship was not self-inflicted. There are two classes 
of cases in this area. One type involves the applicant's violation of the 
ordinance, knowing or unknowing, and his subsequent application for a 
variance based upon his expenditures as the hardship suffered.16 Unless 
the applicant is otherwise entitled to a variance, relief will be denied. 
The second type of case concerns the applicant's purchase of land after 
the enactment of the zoning ordinance, thus making him chargeable with 
knowledge of the restriction imposed on the property. Here the courts 
regard the applicant with disfavor since the hardship could have been 
avoided by not purchasing the land.17 This latter theory, however, is 
subject to fair criticism because it is inconsistent with the idea that the 
granting of a variance depends on the nature of the property rather than 
its owner. If the property is otherwise entitled to a variance, it seems only 
just to grant the variance regardless of the identity of the owner or the 
time when he purchased the property. A fifth standard which 
influences the courts is that a variance will not be granted which 
11 Board of Adjustment v. Stovall, note 7 supra; Pincus v. Power, 376 Pa. 175, 101 A. 
(2d) 914 (1954). 
12 The courts do weigh this factor in ehe setting of whether the land can yield a 
reasonable return if used only for a purpose allowed by the ordinance. See Otto v. 
Steinhilber, note 8 supra. 
13 Levy v. Board of Standards and Appeals, 267 N.Y. 347, 196 N.E. 284 (1935); 
Talmage v. Board of Zoning Appeals, note 8 supra. 
H This requirement is further defined by the courts to relate not only to the 
applicant's property, but also to the particular premises for which the -benefit of the 
variance is sought. Brackett v. Board of Appeal, note 5 supra (applicant, a hotel owner, 
sought a variance for an adjoining vacant lot to use as a parking1 lot, but was denied a 
variance because the parking problem was a hardship affecting the use of the hotel 
lot, not the lot for which the variance was sought); Searles v. Darling, 7 Terry (46 Del.) 
263, 83 A. (2d) 96 (1951). 
15 Arnebergh, "Variances in Zoning," 24 UNIV. KANS. CITY L. REv. 240 (1956); 8 
McQUILI.IN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 2d ed., §25.165 (1957). 
16 Dolan v. Decapua, 16 N.J. 599, 109 A. (2d) 615 (1954); DeFelice v. Zoning Board 
of Appeals, 130 Conn. 156, 32 A. (2d) 635 (1943). 
11 This factor was strongly a!gued in ,the principal case, the court responding that 
it "weighs heavily" against a claim of hardship. Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98, 56 A. 
(2d) 210 (1948). 
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will change the character of the zone in which the property is 
located.18 This standard is intimately related to the common legislative 
requirement that a variance must be in harmony with the general purpose 
and intent of the ordinance. Since the determination of the existence of 
unnecessary hardship is necessarily a question of degree, the courts, 
in looking closely at the effect of the proposed use on the sur-
rounding area, attempt to balance the equities.19 The application of the 
above standards must not be made in a vacuum, but must be interrelated. 
This procedure was carried out in the principal case, the court giving 
special emphasis to the fact that the defendant could have used his property 
for the use permitted in the district and that he purchased with knowledge 
of the restriction. 
Frank D. Jacobs, S.Ed. 
18 Jennings' Appeal, 330 Pa. 154, 198 A. 621 (1938); Otto v. Steinhilber, note 8 supra. 
19 "Even where hardship is shown the board is required to balance such hardship 
against the equities and to determine to what extent the variance, if granted, would 
interfere 'With the zoning plan and the rights of owners of other property." Rochester 
Transit Corp. v. Crowley, note 9 supra, at 937; Holy Sepulchre Cemetery v. Board of Ap-
peals, note 9 supra (court balanced the equities in favor of property owners living a 
mile away from a proposed cemetery). 
